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Negligent Inspector
(continued from page 67)
The Hosfords consequently sued
State Termite and the Inspector
alleging negligence and several oth-
er theories of recovery.
Circuit Court Proceedings
In the Circuit Court of Lowndes
County, Mississippi, State Termite
did not deny that a pest control
operator is held to a duty of reason-
able care similar to that imposed
upon anyone providing expert or
specialized services to the public.
Rather, State Termite claimed
there was no contract between
State Termite and the Hosfords,
and therefore, the Hosfords had no
basis for their suit. The circuit
court agreed. State Termite had
contracted with McCrary and
therefore the Hosfords lacked priv-
ity of contract. Further, the court
ruled that State Termite could not
have foreseen that the Hosfords
would rely on the inspection re-
port. The circuit court granted
summary judgment for State Ter-
mite and the Inspector and dis-
missed the complaint. The Hos-
fords appealed to the Supreme
Court of Mississippi.
Privity of Contract
The Supreme Court of Missis-
sippi rejected State Termite's lack
of privity of contract argument.
The court looked to a state statute
in which the Mississippi Legisla-
ture had declared that privity of
contract would not be a prerequi-
site to any suit for personal injury,
property damage, or economic loss
brought under negligence, strict
liability, or breach of warranty.
Miss. Code Ann. 11-7-20 (1991).
Because the Hosford's action
against State Termite alleged negli-
gence, there was no legal conse-
quence to the fact that the Hos-
fords did not have a contract with
State Termite. Thus, State Termite
could not assert lack of privity of
contract as a defense.
Foreseeability
The Mississippi Supreme Court
also rejected State Termite's de-
fense of lack of foreseeability. The
court looked to the Restatement
(Second) of Torts 552 (1977) which
states that one who, in the course
of business, supplies false informa-
tion due to a failure to exercise
reasonable care or competence in
obtaining or communicating the
information is liable to those who
justifiably rely upon the informa-
tion in their business transactions.
However, under the Restatement,
the supplier of false information is
only liable to those whom he
knows will use the information.
The court also cited an analogous
case that extended liability to those
whom the supplier knows or rea-
sonably should know will use the
information. Therefore, the fact
that McCrary, and not the Hos-
ANNOUNCEMENT
The Loyola Consumer
Law Reporter is currently
accepting lead articles
and feature columns for
publication in upcoming
issues. The Reporter pub-
lishes articles by prac-
titioners, scholars and
consumer experts that ex-
plore in depth legal devel-
opments affecting
consumers. Upcoming
articles will address in-
surance issues for CER-
CLA claims and steps
consumers can take to
avoid environmental lia-
bility when purchasing
real estate.
If you are interested in
submitting an article to
the Reporter please con-
tact the Chief Lead Arti-
cles Editor, Loyola
Consumer Law Reporter,
Loyola University Chi-
cago School of Law, One
East Pearson Street, Chi-
cago, Illinois 60611,
(312) 915-7181.
fords, requested the termite in-
spection was not decisive.
Because the record clearly re-
flected that McCrary bought and
sold houses professionally, the
court charged State Termite with
inferential knowledge that
McCrary was not planning to live
in the house but would probably
use the termite inspection report in
connection with the sale of the
house to another. Thus, the court
found that both State Temite and
the Inspector reasonably should
have foreseen that McCrary's im-
mediate purchaser would obtain
and rely on the inspection report.
In fact, the Hosfords did receive
the report shortly after it was is-
sued and did rely on its accurate-
ness in purchasing the house.
Therefore, the Mississippi Su-
preme Court reversed the circuit
court's decision and remanded the
case for further proceedings.
Daniel Hynes
Consumer Reliance On
Statements About
Pre-Existing Condition
Coverage Creates
Potential Liability For
Insurance Company
In Peek v. Reserve National In-
surance Company, 585 So. 2d 1303
(Ala. 1991), the Supreme Court of
Alabama held that an insurance
company could be liable for breach
of contract and fraudulent misrep-
resentation when consumers relied
on an insurance agent's statements
about pre-existing condition cover-
age and the company later refused
to pay the claim. The court also
held, however, that the insurance
company did not act in bad faith.
Background
On September 3, 1985, Rayburn
and Eve Peek ("the Peeks") met
with Lee Porter, Jr. ("Porter"), an
agent of Reserve National Insur-
ance Company ("Reserve Nation-
al"), to purchase major medical
health insurance for their family.
At that time, the Peeks disclosed to
Porter that their daughter had pre-
viously suffered menstrual difficul-
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ties. Additionally, they furnished
Porter with a doctor's report certi-
fying that exploratory surgery per-
formed in January, 1985 revealed
no abnormalities.
During that meeting, Porter dis-
cussed the doctor's report with
someone on the telephone. Porter
then told the Peeks that their
daughter would be covered under
the policy. At that time, Eve Peek
signed a document entitled "Out-
line of...Coverage." Porter failed to
notify the Peeks that the outline
contained a clause which excluded
coverage for pre'existing condi-
tions. The Peeks contended that
they never received a copy of that
document. The insurance policy
which was subsequently issued and
delivered to the Peeks contained
no such exclusion.
In January, 1986, the Peeks'
daughter was admitted to a hospi-
tal because of pelvic pain; explor-
atory surgery revealed a four-centi-
meter ovarian cyst that was
removed. The surgeon reported
that the cyst had been documented
by sonar three times during the
previous year. Based on this re-
port, Reserve National refused to
pay the Peeks' claim because the
need for surgery arose from a pre-
existing condition.
The Peeks sued Reserve Nation-
al and Porter for breach of con-
tract, fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion, and bad faith refusal to pay a
claim. Porter and Reserve Nation-
al motioned for summary judg-
ment on all three counts. The
Jefferson County Circuit Court
granted the motion, and the Peeks
appealed to the Supreme Court of
Alabama.
Breach of Contract Claim
The Peeks contended that the
insurance contract did not exclude
coverage for pre-existing condi-
tions. The only reference to pre-ex-
isting conditions was in the outline
of coverage which was not part of
the contract. As a result, the Peeks
argued, Reserve National breached
the contract by refusing to pay
their claim. The Alabama Supreme
Court agreed. Because the outline
of coverage was not referenced in
the insurance contract, it was not a
part of the contract.
Additionally, the Peeks asserted
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that their daughter's ovarian cyst
was not a pre-existing condition.
The exploratory surgery performed
in January, 1985 revealed no ab-
normalities. Therefore, the Peeks
claimed that the cyst manifested
itself after the effective date of the
policy, September, 1985. They ar-
gued that at the very least, the
timing of the condition was a factu-
al issue that should have precluded
summary judgment. Further, the
Peeks alleged that Reserve Nation-
al had failed to meet its burden of
proving prior manifestation of the
condition.
Reserve National submitted evi-
dence that the daughter's cyst had
manifested itself prior to the effec-
tive date of the insurance contract.
It introduced the surgeon's report,
which stated that the cyst had been
present for one year prior to the
surgery. On the basis of that report,
Reserve National claimed that the
cyst was a pre-existing condition
and therefore was excluded from
coverage.
The supreme court rejected Re-
serve National's evidence as dis-
positive proof requiring summary
judgment. The court held that a
question of fact existed as to
whether the cyst was present before
the effective date of the insurance
contract. Moreover, the court stat-
ed that even if the cyst had mani-
fested prior to the contract, Re-
serve National may have waived
any rights to exclude further treat-
ment of that condition from cover-
age since it had previously paid
related claims. As a result, the
court reversed summary judgment
as to the breach of contract claim
and remanded the issue to the
lower court.
Fraudulent Misrepresentation
Claim
The Peeks also alleged that Por-
ter's acts constituted fraudulent
misrepresentation. The Peeks pro-
vided Porter with accurate infor-
mation regarding their daughter's
medical condition. After discuss-
ing this information with someone
over the phone, Porter told the
Peeks their daughter would be cov-
ered. Moreover, the Peeks asserted
that Porter never mentioned that
pre-existing conditions would not
be covered by the policy they pur-
chased.
Reserve National argued that no
false misrepresentation had oc-
curred because the daughter was
covered by the insurance policy.
However, the policy excluded cov-
erage for additional treatment of
the daughter's condition.
Additionally, Reserve National
argued that Eve Peek had signed
the outline of coverage, which in-
cluded the pre-existing condition
provision and therefore, the Peeks
were aware of the limitation of
coverage for pre-existing illnesses.
Reserve National thus argued that
the Peeks did not rely on Porter's
statements about coverage. Be-
cause reliance is a necessary part of
a claim of fraudulent misrepresen-
tation, Reserve claimed that the
Peeks should not prevail.
The Alabama Supreme Court
reversed summary judgment on
the fraudulent misrepresentation
issue. The court held that a jury
could reasonably find that by tell-
ing the Peeks their daughter would
be covered and by not mentioning
that further expenses related to the
treatment of her condition would
be excluded, Porter made a misrep-
resentation. Moreover, while the
outline of coverage apparently con-
tradicted these statements, the
court held that a jury could find
that Porter neither gave the Peeks a
copy of the document nor read it to
them. As a result, the court held
that an issue of fact existed as to
whether the Peeks justifiably relied
on Porter's misrepresentation.
Bad Faith Claim
Finally, the court addressed the
claim of bad faith refusal to pay an
insurance claim. The court stated
that the Peeks were required to
show that Reserve National had no
reasonable basis for disputing their
claim. At the time Reserve Nation-
al denied payment of the claim, the
evidence before it, including the
doctor's report referring to the
existence of the cyst for one year
prior to surgery, created a valid
question as to whether payment
was appropriate. As a result, the
court found that Reserve National
had not acted in bad faith and
affirmed summary judgment on
this issue.
Jonathan D. Schultz
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Consumer News:
Prescription Drugs
(continued from page 61)
selves as a promotional message.
When the television audience does
not recognize that there is a promo-
tional objective to be achieved, that
is inherent deception."
Because many stations never
evaluate or edit the VNRs, these
"'news" segments are broadcast
without any mention of the drug
company who produced the video.
By way of contrast, Dr. George
Lundberg, editor in chief for scien-
tific publications of the American
Medical Association notes that
"Our ten A.M.A. journals require
full disclosure of financial interests
of authors, editors, reviewers and
editorial board members."
In these tough economic times,
many stations are grateful for pre-
edited, slick news segments that
help them attract viewers without
spending lots of money. Professor
Secunda predicts that in the cur-
rent marketplace, the use of VNRs
is likely to increase.
The FDA made its first move
against VNRs last year when it sent
a letter to all pharmaceutical com-
panies stating the VNRs would
have to be submitted to the agency
for review. Kenneth D. Feather,
branch chief of drug marketing
surveillance and enforcement for
the FDA explains, "When they
drop a cassette in the mail to NBC
they should drop one in the mail to
the FDA."
New more stringent regulations
are most likely forthcoming. The
FDA has indicated that it is most
concerned with broadcasts of
VNRs that do not clearly reveal the
nature of the "news segment" as a
promotional device paid for by a
pharmaceutical company. Other
concerns include misleading
claims in VNRs and promotion of
unapproved drugs or unapproved
uses for drugs.
New Food Labeling
Guidelines May Fall
Short of Consumers'
Expectations
Last November, the Food and
Drug Administration released its
proposals for stricter guidelines in
food labeling. The FDA first began
working on the new guidelines in
1990 after Congress passed the
Nutrition Labeling and Education
Act. Final guidelines are supposed
to come out in November, 1992,
and all food packaged after May 8,
1993 will feature revised labels.
The new guidelines, however,
may fall short of consumers' expec-
tations for simpler, easier to un-
derstand food labels. All interested
citizens had until the end of Febru-
ary to submit their comments on
the proposed labeling guidelines.
Consumer advocates have pushed
for stricter limitations on the
claims food producers may make
about their products.
A 1989 Roper poll showed that
52 percent of consumers look to
food labels for information on nu-
trition. The new labeling standards
are supposed give meaning to
claims on food packaging, and con-
sumers have been waiting for
changes for quite awhile.
"During the Reagan Adminis-
tration, the theory went that if
competition were allowed to take
its course, the false and misleading
claims would be weeded out," ex-
plains F. Edward Scarbrough, di-
rector of the Office of Food Safety
and Food Sciences at the FDA's
Center for Food Safety and Ap-
plied Nutrition. "Instead, we saw
oat bran in just about everything
from beer to donuts," Scarbrough
adds.
The FDA's original proposed
guidelines, released last Novem-
ber, contained strict definitions for
some of the claims commonly ap-
pearing on food labels. For exam-
ple, the term "reduced" was strict-
ly defined in a dictionary of
"descriptors." Any food labeled
"reduced fat" had to have at least
50 percent less fat than comparable
products. Any product labeled "re-
duced sodium" would have to have
at least 50 percent less sodium than
comparable products.
The FDA, however, knew that it
would have to soften its initial
proposals. The Office of Manage-
ment and Budget ("OMB"), which
oversees all actions by the FDA,
directed the FDA to modify its
original proposals.
The OMB directed these guide-
lines to be changed, and the FDA
was obliged to come up with alter-
native guidelines. Under the alter-
native guidelines, any product for
which the fat content is reduced by
at least 3 grams may be labeled
"less fat" or "reduced fat." If the
sodium content is lowered by 140
milligrams, a product may be la-
beled "reduced sodium."
If the product is a premium ice
cream bar, containing 27 grams a
fat, it may be labeled "reduced fat"
if the fat content is lowered to 24
grams or less. Similarly, if the
product is a salty can of soup,
containing 900 milligrams of salt,
it may nonetheless be labeled "re-
duced sodium" if the sodium con-
tent has been lowered by 140 milli-
grams.
The OMB may have been advo-
cating a return to the hands off
approach of the Reagan Adminis-
tration. The OMB reportedly con-
tends that relaxed standards will
encourage companies to compete
with healthier products.
Recent Legislative Activity
(continued from page 59)
Disclosure on Credit Cards
California is considering an
amendment to the Song-Beverly
Credit Card Act of 1971 which
would require issuers of credit
cards secured by real or personal
property to disclose in advertise-
ments and solicitations that credit
extended under the credit card is
secured by the cardholder's proper-
ty. The amendment would also
require that the credit card be
identified as a "secured credit
card" and must clearly describe the
security by item or type. The
amendment provides for this type
of disclosure in order to protect
consumers from unknowingly los-
ing their property, especially their
homes, by not meeting the card-
holder's obligations.
The provisions of this amend-
ment would not be applicable
where the agreement creates a pur-
chase money security interest in
property purchased with the credit
card. A violation of the amend-
ment would constitute unfair com-
petition. 1991 CA A.B. 998.
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